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V

ictorious insurgencies are exceptional because the strong usually beat
the weak.1 But all power is relative, and if an insurgency has access to external assistance, such assistance can alter the insurgent-government power
ratio even to the point where the insurgency becomes the stronger side. This is
what happened during the American War of Independence. This is what did
not happen during the American Civil War. External assistance made Yorktown possible; its absence condemned the Confederacy to Appomattox. To be
sure, external assistance is no guarantee of insurgent success, but there are
few if any examples of unassisted insurgent victories against determined and
resourceful governments.
Much of the key theoretical literature on the phenomenon of weak
victories over the strong discounts or altogether ignores the importance of external assistance. Andrew Mack argues that the best explanation of insurgent
success is possession of superior political will and therefore greater readiness
to sacrifice; the insurgents win because they wage a total war against an enemy that fights but a limited war.2 Ivan Arreguin-Toft contends that superior
strategy—e.g., protracted irregular warfare against a conventional foe—best
explains insurgent victories.3 Gil Merom believes that chances of insurgent
success hinge greatly on government regime type; insurgencies fare much
better against democracies than against dictatorships because the former lack
the stomach for brutal repression.4
These explanations share a common assumption: the key to offsetting
the stronger side’s material superiority lies in the weaker side’s possession of
superiority in such intangibles as political will and strategy. The United States
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was defeated in Indochina because the Vietnamese Communists displayed a
far greater willingness to fight and die5 and pursued a strategy that simultaneously limited their exposure to US military strengths (firepower, air mobility) and exploited American political vulnerabilities (the electorate’s aversion
to indecisive, protracted wars for limited objectives).
However, even the most committed and cunning insurgency cannot
hope to win without material resources. A rebellion must have arms. The
Vietnamese Communists, among the most tenacious and skilled enemies the
United States has ever fought, could hardly have prevailed unarmed, which is
how they would have had to fight absent the massive Soviet and Chinese assistance they in fact received. North Vietnam, the political and military engine of the Communist war in Indochina, had no arms industry; it had to
import even small arms and small-arms ammunition from the Soviet Union,
China, and other Communist Bloc countries. The Soviets and the Chinese
also supplied trucks, radios, medicines, medical equipment, artillery, tanks,
fighter aircraft, naval vessels, an integrated state-of-the-art national air defense system, thousands of technical advisors, and over 300,000 (Chinese)
logistics troops who manned and maintained North Vietnam’s railroad system against US air assault.6 Had the Vietnamese Communists been isolated
from external assistance, as were their fellow Communist insurgents in Malaya and the Philippines in the latter 1940s and early 1950s, they almost
certainly would have suffered the same fate: defeat. But the United States
was never in a position to seal off North Vietnam from the Communist Bloc,
much less South Vietnam from North Vietnam. It was the combination of
stronger political will, superior strategy, and foreign help that decided the
Vietnam War.

T

he same is true of the American War of Independence. As in Vietnam, the
rebels in America fought a total war while the metropolitan power fought
a limited war. The rebels gambled their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor on
victory, whereas, for British commanders, defeat meant reassignment elsewhere or a return to the pleasures of London society. For the British, North
America was a distant theater of operations; for the Americans, it was home.
Indeed, after France intervened on the rebel side, North America became, for
the British, not a secondary, but rather a tertiary theater of operations (after
Europe, where Britain faced the possibility of invasion, and the Caribbean,
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where Britain sought to defend its fabulously lucrative Jamaica and other
sugar and spice islands).
The Americans also had a superior strategy: (1) protracted irregular
warfare conducted by local militias, guerrilla bands, and an elusive Continental Army aimed at wearing down Britain’s political will, coupled with (2) a
search for foreign intervention that could neutralize British material superiority. Though George Washington initially sought a conventional military
decision in and around what is now the greater New York City area, he soon
came to recognize the perils of positional warfare against a materially superior professional army (especially one supported by the guns of the Royal
Navy). He reverted to a strategy of hit-and-run attacks against exposed British and Hessian detachments based on the implicit assumption that the Continental Army could win, or at least not lose, simply by surviving. As Donald
Snow and Dennis Drew observe:
Washington knew he had no reasonable hope of victory against the British . . . in
open battle. At best he could wage defensive battles, judiciously withdraw after
inflicting casualties, and wait to fight another day. With some good fortune
(and poor British tactics) Washington might be able to fall upon isolated portions of the British force and inflict small defeats. Washington’s objective had
to be to buy time, raise the cost of the war to the British, and hope that they
would tire of the whole affair. The other American hope was for foreign help
from France, Britain’s traditional enemy and colonial rival.7

The British, for their part, seemed to have no strategy other than
seizing cities like New York and Philadelphia in the hope that Washington
would come out and fight. British forces in the Thirteen Colonies, whose peak
strength was 35,000,8 were woefully insufficient to seize control of colonial
America; they could do little more than hold selected ports and make occasional forays into the hostile American interior, where they faced constant attrition by American irregulars. An entire army under Sir John Burgoyne was
entrapped in upstate New York by the all too often formidable combination of
the regular Continental Army screened and supported by militias. Indeed, the
British were unprepared to cope with the mix of regular and irregular warfare,
and in the end, according to one assessment, it was “unconventional victories
[in the countryside] that enabled Washington’s conventional army to survive
and ultimately to triumph. The British lost the war in the countryside.”9
Nor did it help that the colonial insurgency had no center of gravity.
Piers Mackesy sympathizes with the British commanders:
Where was the center of gravity of the American rebellion? This loose confederation had no centralized administration to be overthrown by the occupation
of a capital city, no common economic interest whose destruction would bring
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down the edifice. Was the center of gravity to be found in the Continental
Army? It was unassailable [because] Washington’s aim was to avoid or postpone decision, and he could do so by withdrawing into inaccessible country and
impregnable positions.10

The British were further plagued by distance and lack of reliable logistical access to the colonial countryside. The difficulties of projecting and
sustaining military power across 3,000 miles of often turbulent ocean in the
pre-Industrial Age were formidable enough, but for the British in North
America they were greatly exacerbated by rebel control of the countryside,
which made it impossible for British forces to sustain themselves on indigenous fuel (wood and coal), forage (for horses and oxen), and foodstuffs, most
of which had to be transported from Great Britain across waters swarming
with American privateers.
Notwithstanding the formidable operational and logistical challenges confronting the British, however, the American insurgency lacked the
power to move the war from stalemate to decisive victory. The transformative
event was France’s formal entry into the war following Burgoyne’s surrender
at Saratoga in October 1777. Even before Saratoga the French government,
working in concert with Congress’s agent in France, Silas Deane, was covertly shipping large quantities of arms, gunpowder, and equipment to the
Americans through a dummy trading company. The military cargoes, which
included 30,000 muskets, artillery, tents, 300,000 pounds of gunpowder, and
25,000 uniforms, proved “indispensable to American forces fighting in the
campaigns of 1777, especially troops charged with stopping Burgoyne.”11
More—much more—was to come.
The establishment of a formal alliance with France in 1778, which
was followed in 1779 and 1780, respectively, by Spanish and Dutch declarations of war against Britain (though not as allies of the American rebels),
opened the floodgates to massive French financial credits, gunpowder shipments (90 percent of the gunpowder consumed by American forces during the
war12), and direct French military and naval intervention in North America, including an army under the command of General le Compte de Rochambeau and
a fleet commanded by Admiral le Compte de Grasse. It was these forces, especially de Grasse’s seizure of control of the Chesapeake Bay (severing Lord
Cornwallis’s sole supply line), that delivered the clinching victory at Yorktown in 1781. The decisiveness of French intervention was reflected in the opposing orders of battle at Yorktown: against a British force of 8,500 troops and
no supporting warships, and alongside a Continental Army of 9,000 American
troops and no supporting warships, the French contributed 38 ships-of-the-line
and 22,800 troops, including 15,000 marines and armed sailors.13 Indeed, by
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the time Franco-American forces began investing Yorktown, it is probable that
Britain was no longer the stronger side in North America. The fact that an insurgency starts out as the weaker side does not preclude its eventual transformation, via foreign intervention, into the stronger side.
But France’s greatest contribution was strategic: by declaring war on
Britain, France transformed what, for Britain, had been a colonial insurgency
into a world war. By the end of 1780, ally-less Britain was fighting France,
Spain, and the Netherlands, whose combined ships-of-the-line totaled 180 to
Britain’s 120,14 in North America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and the
Indian Ocean. Together with several hundred American privateers, the French,
Spanish, and Dutch navies threatened not only Britain’s trans-Atlantic lines of
communication and its sugar-rich empire in the Caribbean but also the security
of Britain itself. For the first time in over a century, control over the maritime
approaches to the British Isles was seriously threatened by a naval coalition
whose chief member—France—also fielded the best army in Europe. For Britain, the war in North America had suddenly become a strategic liability. Anthony James Joes does not overstate the case that “there is probably no more
clear-cut example of the importance of outside help to the success of an insurgency than the American War of Independence.” Especially critical was the
French navy, “which carried French troops to America as well as gold, clothing, and cannons to Washington’s army [and] kept that specter of an invasion
luridly before British eyes [and] interrupted the already quite tenuous system
whereby the British supplied their forces in America.”15

I

f the first great American insurgency demonstrated the decisive importance
of external assistance, the second great American insurgency demonstrated
the decisive importance of its absence. The Confederacy, an insurgency initiated by the Southern states against continued membership in the United States,
chose to make war against a Union that was much stronger in the material indices of power that counted in the mid-19th century. The North had an 8:1 advantage in draftable (i.e., white) manpower, a 6:1 advantage in financial resources
and industrial production, a 4:1 advantage in railroad track mileage, and an
overwhelming superiority in commercial maritime and naval power, including
a latent capacity to gain control of the waterways that bounded and crisscrossed
the Confederacy.16 Nor was the North burdened by a large and potentially rebellious slave population; indeed, whereas Confederate ideology precluded military service for blacks, at least until the very end of the war, a total of 190,000
blacks—nine percent of all those who wore the federal uniform—performed
service in the Union army or navy.17 In Abraham Lincoln the Union also had an
even greater superiority in political leadership; and in Ulysses S. Grant and
William Tecumseh Sherman the Union—albeit belatedly—had military lead40
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ership that, like Lincoln, appreciated the war at the strategic level (in contrast
to Robert E. Lee, whose vision of the war was confined to his own theater of operations) and understood the operational and strategic opportunities afforded
by the North’s manpower and industrial superiority. Above all, they understood the strategic opportunities that flowed from the waters that surrounded
and ran through the Confederacy.
Under these circumstances, the operational virtuosity of Lee and his
Army of Northern Virginia, though greatly assisted until 1864 by an Army of
the Potomac commanded by generals varyingly timid (McClellan), mediocre
(Pope, Hooker, Meade), or incompetent (Burnside), could only retard the
Confederacy’s inevitable strategic defeat. Retrospectively, it can be argued
that the Confederate leadership’s great mistake, aside from starting the Civil
War, was to wage a conventional war against a conventionally superior foe.
By fighting the Union on its own terms, the Confederacy pitted its weakness
against Union strength. (A little more than a century later, in the Tet Offensive
of 1968 and the Easter Offensive of 1972, North Vietnam’s Communist forces
suffered terrible military defeats when they attempted positional warfare
against US forces.) Arreguin-Toft rightly argues against the weaker side selecting the same strategy as the stronger side. “If strong and weak actors use a
strategy representing the same strategic approach—direct against direct, indirect against indirect—strong actors should win.” On the other hand, if
“strong and weak actors employ strategies representing opposite strategic approaches—direct against indirect or indirect against direct—weak actors are
much more likely to win.”18 The weaker South chose a direct strategy against
the stronger North, which pursued a direct strategy against the South.
If this analysis is correct, then the South had only two hopes for victory: to reduce the unfavorable material odds via foreign intervention or, failing that, to adopt an indirect strategy of guerrilla warfare, a strategy for which
there was ample precedent in the Spanish guerrilla of 1808-1814 against the
French occupation of Spain. Unfortunately, prospects for foreign help in the
form of British and French diplomatic recognition (and subsequent access to
British and French war materiel) were problematic from the beginning. By
late summer of 1862, French Emperor Napoleon III favored recognition, but
only if Britain would follow suit. In Britain, however, public opinion was divided: upper-class conservatives favored recognition, whereas the middle
and working classes opposed it. The government itself also was divided: Lord
Russell, the foreign secretary, wanted to recognize the Confederacy, whereas
Lord Palmerston, the prime minister, was most reluctant because he believed
recognition would lead to war with the United States. In the end, it all boiled
down to whether the South could convincingly demonstrate that it could defend its declared independence. In this regard, Lee’s defeat at Antietam in
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September 1862 and Lincoln’s subsequent issuance of the Emancipation
Proclamation, which committed the Union to the abolition of slavery (a very
popular cause in Britain), fatally weakened Confederate prospects for foreign
intervention.19 As for the option of guerrilla warfare, it was beyond the imagination of the leading Confederate generals, who saw themselves as soldiers in
the European tradition of regular combat, and who were in any event hardly
disposed to embracing a strategy whose very example could inspire slave insurrections—the nightmare of the White South.20
Antietam, not Gettysburg, was the strategically decisive battle of the
war because it ended any real prospect of foreign intervention and because it
permitted Lincoln to transform the war from an arcane dispute over the relationship between the individual states to the Union into a moral crusade against
slavery. Absent external intervention, the South was probably doomed to defeat as long as Lincoln’s genius, assisted by timely Union victories, could sustain sufficient northern support for his war policies.
The American War of Independence and Civil War are hardly conclusive proof of the vitality of external assistance to insurgent success. Fighting
power is a mélange of measurables (e.g., troop strength, weapons counts, sortie
rates) and intangibles (e.g., generalship, organizational quality, morale). It
seems reasonable to conclude that no amount of outside help could redeem the
fortunes of a politically and strategically incompetent insurgency; thus the
Tito-assisted Greek Communist insurgency was defeated in 1949 because it
had no popular political program and because it pursued conventional military
operations against a conventionally superior foe. Conversely, it seems no less
reasonable that highly motivated and skilled insurgents—the Boers in South
Africa, for example—can be defeated if denied access to external assistance.
But the correlation between external assistance and insurgent victory,
and a lack of foreign intervention and insurgent defeat, is striking. The insurgents in the American War of Independence (1775-1783), the Spanish guerrilla against the French (1808-1814), the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), the
French-Indochinese War (1946-1954), the Vietnam War (1965-1973), and the
Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) were all assisted, and all won. In contrast, the
insurgents in countless peasant rebellions in the pre-Napoleonic era and in
such post-Napoleonic insurgencies as the Indian Mutiny (1857-1858), American Civil War (1861-1854), the Boer War (1899-1902),21 the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960),22 and the Philippine Communist insurgency of the late
1940s and early 1950s were all unassisted, and all lost. Only against the most
enfeebled government (e.g., the French regime of Louis XVI in 1789, the Czarist government in 1917, the Batista regime in Cuba in 1959) is an unassisted rebellion likely to triumph. In such cases the government, not the insurgents, is
the weaker side.
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S

ome have argued that the Chinese Communist defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Government, the Kuomintang (KMT), is an example
of an unassisted insurgent victory. This judgment, however, requires qualification. Though it is highly probable, given the KMT’s utterly corrupted leadership and strategic incompetence, that the superbly led Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and its highly skilled, disciplined, and motivated military arm,
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), would have won without direct foreign
assistance, they were nonetheless beneficiaries of significant support from
the Soviet Union. The PLA was, to be sure, an exclusively internal Chinese
creation, and it emerged from World War II as a large and very impressive
military and political force. Starting in 1946, however, it began receiving,
from departing Soviet forces in Manchuria, large quantities of Japanese
weapons—sufficient to equip 600,000 to 700,000 troops—which the Soviets
had taken from the surrendered Kwangtung Army.23 Additionally, the Soviet
occupation of Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946 established external
Communist control over a strategically vital area where the CCP was politically and militarily weak (Manchuria had been under complete Japanese control from 1931 to 1945). Soviet authorities in Manchuria blocked the entry of
KMT forces while permitting hundreds of thousands of CCP political cadre
and PLA troops to enter Manchuria where, by the time the Soviets departed,
they had established control of the countryside.24
The role—obviously unintentional—of the Japanese army in Manchuria and China proper from 1931 to 1945 in paving the way for the CCP’s
victory also must be considered. Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931 deprived the KMT of China’s industrial heartland,25 and Japan’s seizure and occupation, from 1937 to 1945, of all of coastal and much of inland China opened
the door for CCP infiltration of areas now vacant of a KMT presence. (Japanese
forces were concentrated in the cities and along the strategic lines of communication.) Japanese aggression also excited Chinese nationalism, on which the
CCP was much better able to capitalize than the KMT. Walter Laqueur believes
that the “two main causes of the Communist victory [in China] were the general disruption caused by the Japanese invasion and occupation and the superiority of Sino-Communism as a force rallying the masses. . . . The [N]ationalists
had been weak even before 1937; subsequent military defeats accelerated and
deepened the process of decomposition.” Bard O’Neill agrees:
The Japanese occupation was fortuitous for Mao because it provided a nationalist appeal around which support could be rallied and also because it diverted
the attention of the Kuomintang away from the Chinese Communist insurgents.
Moreover, as the war dragged on, Mao’s stature as a heroic nationalist was enhanced, while the dislocation and costs of the fighting further weakened
Chiang Kai-shek’s position. Indeed, there is reason to question whether Mao’s
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strategy would have been successful against the Kuomintang if the Japanese
had not invaded China.26

The Communist victory in China had profound strategic consequences for the Communist insurgency in French-Indochina—yet another case of
enabling external assistance. In the French-Indochina War, the insurgent Viet
Minh were initially (1946-1949) isolated from outside assistance; they were
short on military experience, poorly armed, and incapable of mounting the kind
of major military operations that finally collapsed French political will in
1954. What turned the tide was the PLA victory in China and subsequent conversion of the Sino-Vietnamese border into a conduit of major Chinese military
assistance in the form of professional advisors and training teams, large quantities of small arms and military gear, and, most important, modern artillery captured from Chiang Kai-shek’s armies.27 It was Chinese-supplied artillery that
enabled the Viet Minh to crush the large French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and
it was the fall of Dien Bien Phu that produced the French political concessions
at the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended French rule in Indochina and established Communist rule in what became North Vietnam.
In April 1950 the CCP’s Central Military Commission ordered the establishment of a training school in China for Vietnamese officers and the creation of a Chinese Military Advisory Group that supplied Chinese military
advisors to the Viet Minh army headquarters and downward to divisional and
regimental levels. Over the next five months China also supplied the Viet Minh
with thousands of rifles and machine guns, 300 bazookas, 150 mortars, 60 artillery pieces, and large quantities of munitions, medicines, communications
gear, clothes, and food.28 This assistance enabled the Viet Minh to clear French
forces and outposts from Vietnam’s border area with China, eliminating any
obstacles to passage of further assistance from China. Chinese provinces bordering Vietnam were converted into training and logistical sanctuaries for the
Viet Minh. During 1951 and 1952 China accelerated arms deliveries, and from
1952 to 1954 Chinese war material tonnage delivered monthly to the Viet Minh
rose from 250 to 4,000 tons.29 The Chinese effectively transformed the Viet
Minh from elusive bands of guerrillas into a formidable conventional army.
(The battle of Dien Bien Phu was a miniature Asian Verdun—a thoroughly
conventional fight involving frontal assaults on fortified defensive positions.)
The massive aid in training and supplies [following the arrival of the PLA on
the Vietnamese border] provided by the Chinese to the Viet Minh allowed the
latter to entirely refit their army into a powerful force capable for the first time
of engaging the French Expeditionary Corps in battle. With the onset of the
rains in June 1950, the Viet Minh sent its battalions to Chinese training camps
in the region of Wenshan, Long Tcheou, and Chingshi. The troops, without
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arms, crossed the border on foot and once in China were transported by truck.
Clothed in new uniforms, they followed an intensive training course for three
months under Chinese instructors. The Viet Minh used these troops to form an
entirely new military organization. From 2,000 men, the Viet Minh regiment
rose to 3,578 men. At all echelons, these regiments were henceforth supported
by heavy equipment, signals, and headquarters units. Some 20,000 men rotated
through this training in 1950 alone.30

Chinese-supplied weapons and logistical support were crucial to the
Communists’ politically decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu. The French committed major errors in underestimating the Viet Minh’s fighting power and in
choosing to fight at a place so distant from the center of their military strength
in northern Vietnam (the Red River Delta). But Dien Bien Phu, a remote place
in the middle of mountainous jungles, was as much of a logistical challenge
for the Viet Minh as it was for the French, and it was the logistical battle that
determined the outcome of the siege. The PLA supplied Viet Minh forces surrounding Dien Bien Phu from Chinese supply bases 600 miles away, moving
supplies via 600 Soviet 2.5-ton trucks and thousands of specifically configured bicycles, capable of carrying 400 pounds, pushed on foot by porters; together, these conveyances moved a total of almost 8,300 tons of weapons,
ammunition, food, and other supplies to the Viet Minh during the siege.31
It was Chinese-supplied artillery, including 48 superb US-made
105-millimeter howitzers (captured from KMT forces in the late 1940s or
from US forces in Korea),32 that set up the French garrison for successful Viet
Minh infantry assault and that defeated attempts to save the garrison through
aerial resupply. Viet Minh artillery not only dominated French artillery and
inflicted heavy losses on French infantry; it also incapacitated the Dien Bien
Phu airstrip and exacted a heavy toll on the French air force supporting the
garrison. Especially effective were the four battalions’ worth of Soviet 37millimeter anti-aircraft guns. Over time, those guns, together with other artillery, shot down or destroyed on the ground 62 French aircraft and damaged
another 167—extremely heavy losses for an air force that at any given time
never had more than 75 combat aircraft and 100 supply and reconnaissance
aircraft to support Dien Bien Phu.33

T

he Algerian War (1954-1962), the subject of much recent professional
military interest, offers additional, if more complicated, evidence of the
vitality of external assistance. At great cost, the insurgent Front de Liberation
Nationale (FLN) won politically but lost militarily, and it lost militarily because of ruthless French counterinsurgency methods and French success in
shutting off external material assistance. The French army had learned much
from its defeat in Indochina, where it was never in a position to isolate the
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Viet Minh from Chinese Communist assistance, and in Algeria it faced a
smaller and much less politically formidable enemy than the Viet Minh. The
peak strength of the FLN’s military arm, the Armee de Liberation Nationale
(ALN), never exceeded 40,000, including regulars, auxiliaries, and irregulars, and it is testimony to the FLN’s limited political appeal within Algeria
that five times that number of Algerians fought on the French side.34 The FLN,
which was governed by a fractious collective leadership, lacked not only a
charismatic, Ho Chi Minh-like, single authoritative leader, but also any political program for the impoverished rural masses of the country. Unlike the
Vietnamese Communists, who promised land as well as national liberation to
the peasantry, the FLN promised national but no social liberation.
Even had the FLN enjoyed a larger popular support, which its heavy
reliance on urban terrorism worked against, it confronted a massive French
military presence and a skilled and barbarously effective counterinsurgent
strategy. French forces in Algeria peaked in 1960 at 500,000, by which time
there were only a few thousand ALN fighters still operating in the country
(the bulk of the ALN was ensconced on the other side of the Tunisian border).35 French forces always maintained at least a 10:1 numerical advantage
over insurgents inside Algeria. Moreover, they made widespread use of torture, collective punishments, and forcible population relocations to extract
intelligence, terrorize potential FLN supporters, and isolate vulnerable communities from FLN penetration. In 1957, in the face of an FLN terrorist campaign launched in Algiers, the French government transferred civil authority
in Algiers to the military, which proceeded to crush the FLN in Algiers. In
what became known as the Battle of Algiers, elite parachute units under the
command of General Jacques Massu brutally broke an FLN-sponsored general strike (by threatening to destroy shops on the spot unless shop owners
opened them) and then savagely rooted out the FLN infrastructure through
mass arrests and torture.36
But what really killed any chance of an FLN military win was the
French success in physically isolating the insurgency from external material
assistance. During the first two years of the insurgency, the FLN suffered an
acute shortage of weapons; it armed itself largely with what weapons it could
capture from government security and police forces. This situation changed
dramatically when France granted independence to neighboring Morocco
and Tunisia in March 1956. From then on, those two countries became conduits of external Arab military assistance. Tunisia also became a sanctuary
for ALN forces; indeed, as the war got worse for the FLN inside Algeria, Tunisia became the FLN’s main operating base. It encamped on the Tunisian
side of the Algerian border, armed and trained its forces there, and then
launched raids into Algeria.
46
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The French could have responded by invading western Tunisia, but
chose instead to erect a barrier over 200 miles long from the Mediterranean
southward to the empty Sahara, where border crossings could be easily detected. The barrier consisted of an eight-foot electric fence charged with
5,000 volts and flanked on both sides by 50-yard belts of ground seeded with
anti-personnel mines and backed up by thick, World War I-style barbed wire
entanglements. (A similar barrier was constructed along the MoroccanAlgerian border.) Completed in 1957 and known as the Morice Line (after
French Defense Minister Andre Morice), the barrier was defended by 80,000
troops who constantly patrolled the line and had immediate on-call artillery
to shell any attempted insurgent infiltration.37 The border area was also
cleared, through regroupment, of populations potentially sympathetic to the
insurgency.
By the end of April 1958, an estimated 6,000 insurgents and 4,300
weapons hade been snared in attempts to cross the line into Algeria, and the
ALN made no more significant attempts to breach it.38 From then on, ALN
strength inside Algeria declined even as it expanded in Tunisia. Together with
naval control of the Algerian coastline, the French had achieved in Algeria
what they had failed to achieve—as would later the Americans—in Indochina: isolation of the insurgents from foreign military help. The effects of
this isolation, coupled with stepped-up French counterinsurgency operations
inside Algeria, were militarily decisive:
The French strategy had a devastating impact on the Algerian insurgents.
Whole FLN and ALN formations were hunted down in their previous sanctuaries—the night and the mountains. The units of the nationalist movement became younger, less experienced, badly supplied, and often short-lived. Their
morale, critical for a prolonged campaign, was deeply shattered. Local FLN
commanders inside Algeria began to realize the magnitude of the damage inflicted by the French force, even before 1959. Algerian communities rejected
the FLN’s authority more vigorously than before, its forces’ efforts to extract
money failed more frequently, and the organization’s overall revenues diminished accordingly. The exiled nationalist leadership was confronted by the
hard-pressed leaders of the forces inside Algeria who bluntly questioned its
motives and objectives as well as prospects of success in the struggle.39

But if France had won the military war, it lost the political war. By
1958 the war’s mounting blood and treasure costs, and France’s brutal tactics,40 had alienated most of the French electorate and had propelled the decrepit French Fourth Republic into an ultimately fatal political crisis from
which emerged a new republic and a Charles de Gaulle determined to rid
France of its Algerian albatross. Algeria received its independence in 1962.
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T

he strong correlation between external assistance and insurgent success
does not diminish the insurgent requirement for superiority in such intangibles as will, strategy, organization, morale, and discipline. External
assistance can favorably, even decisively, alter the material power ratio between an insurgency and an enemy government or foreign occupier. For
either the insurgent side or the counterinsurgent side, material strength unguided by sound strategy and unsupported by sufficient willingness to fight
and die is a recipe for almost certain defeat. But most insurgencies seek foreign help for good reason.
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